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FISCAI, E'EIIERALISAI: P R O G R M I  BUDGETING 
AN11 TIIE \ll~LTILE:VEL GOVERNMENTAL SETTING 
F'. Gregory [layden 
lssoczate Professor of Economics, lJnzverstty o f  Nebraska-Lincoln 
'The purpose of this artic:Ie is to  determine what theoretical and policy 
conclusions are consistent with the or thodox theory of social arid merit 
wants,' the treatment of distribution as a component of efficiency,2 and 
a Planning-Progarnming-Rudgeti~ig System when they are placed in a 
federalist setting with states' rights and  local autonomy. The conclusion 
is that neitller matching nor equalizatio~i grarits should be used in inter- 
governtnr:ntal fiscal relations and that use of traditiorlal intergovernmental 
fiscal devices will not assure success of a programmed budget. 
THE ECONOMIC EFFECT ON THE ALLOCATION BUDGET 
CAUSED BY HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL SPLITTING 
IN POLITICAL FEDERALISM 
In this section the effect of political federalism on fiscal matters will be 
;~pproached in two ways. The first model will have no  spatial spill-outs or 
spill-ins of cost or benefits and will have a d1:sirable distribution of income. 
'I'he other rnodel will relax the  stringerit assumptions of t h e  first and 
analyze spill-outs through ir~tliffererice analysis. 
lllodel without Benefit Spills 
The first rnodel is of country A with initial assumptions as follows: 
1. Tl~erc  are two levels of government--the: cetrtral authority A and 
subsidiary (sub) uriits W,  X, 17, and Z. 
2. There arc! two types  of social goods-i/l, which benefits everyone in 
./I equally, artd !V, which benefits everyone equally in the sub in which it is 
provided (uniform benefits). 'Thus there arc r ~ o  benefit spills. 
3. Social goods are tax-financed with 110 debt creation. 
4. Full employrrlent prevails. 
5 .  There arc n o  cost spills from sub t o  sub. Thus there is no tax shift- 
ing to citizens of other subs. 
' ~ i c h a r d  A. blusgrave, The lllteory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1 959).  
2 ~ u r t o n  A. Weisbrod, "Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost Analysis," 
in Samuel B. Chase, ed.,  Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1968). 
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6. A1 irlcomea arcL equal, and tire tastes regarding i n c o n ~ r  distributior~ 
are such that the citizens of il wish t o  leavc. it equal. 
7. 211 benefits and costs call be rneasurc,d. 
The central govt:rnment A will providt, 121 and the subs will providi: $'V to  
suit the tastes of  their ow11 c i t i ze~~s .  'To satisfy the benefit principle, all 
citizens of ..I will pay equal taxes to .1 1)t:cause they sharc: ,l.l equally (not 
because their incornes are equal). All citizens within each sub will pa? 
equal taxes to  that sub, although thc arnou~ll  may be different from suh 
to sub due to differences in tastt:. Of course, .4 will provide ,I! up to thtl 
point that the marginal social cost of ,W is equal t o  the  marginal social 
benefits of 121, and IT), X, Y,  and Z will determine their level of N in  a 
similar rnanner. 
In deciding upon an .V, central goverr~mer~t 4 will need to define what 
kind of M is desired (for c*xample, riot all tducation is alike) and what level 
of servicr is t o  be provided, and will design a plan to  take account of the 
technical difficulties involved. That is. a well-defined programmatic ap- 
proach to achieve a well-defined goal is appropriate. Programmatic funds 
may or ]nay not pass through sub offices. That will be determined b j  
administrative ease, but adrnirlistrativc, ease is not our interest here. h o w  if' 
all arc, t o  benefit equally, there rnust l)c no discrimination among areas by 
providing differant service levels. 
Having equal service levtrls dotrs not rrlearl equal expenditures in all sub 
units nor docs it mean that c.xpenditures will vary in any given manner 
with income. Exper~ditures rrrust IJV varied t o  allow for technical vari- 
ations. Such variations include everythirrg from soil chemistry t o  ethnic: 
groups and the vestiges of history-t.vt:rything that will affect cost in pro- 
viding the desired level of perfornlancc.. s s u m e  ,A is to  provide an inte- 
grated transportation system and a vcnt:real disease prt:vt:ntion program. 
Ur~less there is a definite correlatiort betwi.cn ~ h r  hardness of rock for road 
beds and income or between vc:nerral disc:asc: susceptibility and incon~c.  
expenditures should not be tied to incon~t. lt~vels. 
If ?W is provided t o  the point that social costs equal social benefits, therct 
is no  reason for voluntary matching grants and/or unconditio~tal grants to  
provide a programmatic service. 111 thv first place, the government of 
wants a certain level of social good ,W provided, hut unless the citizens' 
wants of A are not to  be frustrated by 2, then the power structure of Z 
should not be allowed voluntarily t o  rcject the  program by rejecting thc 
funds or by  accepting the  funds but  using them for other than the  intended 
program. Second, the citizens of A should not be forced to share the costs 
beyond program needs that  a sub area decides t o  add for local enjoyment, 
such as a lavish gymnasium, simply because Z will get matching funds for 
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all "educational" expenditures. Third, matching funds may induce a mis- 
allocation of local resources by bribing local governments t o  withdraw 
funds from local wants. 
Now let us change the second assumption arid assume that a social good 
is such that part of the benefits will acc,rue t o  the people of A and part of 
the benefits to  those of the sub only (uniform benefits in each). Now if 
only A provides the social good to the point that the marginal social cost 
is equal to the marginal social benefit, there will be an underallocation of 
resources unless the local government also provides the same social good to  
the point that its marginal social cost equals its marginal social benefit. 
That is, the citizens of the sub may discover that they want a level of the 
social good beyond that provided by central A. 
i ln example is education. The central government may provide a given 
level to all subs, and some subs may want additional education to  capture 
additional local benefits. Now, once A's lecel of education has been estab- 
lished, there is no reason that the sub carinot have its own program to  
provide still more. From the standpoint of efficiency, there is no reason to  
reward or punish those who provide more education than the central level. 
Uor should financial punishment and reward be meted out by A according 
ito the tax effort of the sub unit's program. It is not the place of the higher 
level to  make judgments abctut purely local wants. 'The higher level has its 
responsibility to provide a gven level of service. If A wants a higher level 
of service, then its program should provid~: that higher level. If A's pro- 
gram is intended to yrovid~: four years of a specific type of education to  
each child, then Z carinot use A's funds to give twelve years of education 
to a ~ C W  and nonta to  others. Therefore the total educational program may 
he difl'erc>rrt in each sub, but in all subs A's program is guaranteed. 
Let us assume that sub % decides not to  cooperate with central A in 
administering A's program of insuring a given level of services in all cities. 
There is no reason from the standpoint of efficiency that A cannot go 
directly to city P to administer the program if P is wiHing to  cooperate. 
11' is an administrative question, not a question of who should provide how 
ruurh of the service. The latter question hab already been answered. The 
decision has been made by the higher level A t o  provide the service. Since 
Z will not cooperate, the question is whether A should set up its own 
ntllninistrative facilitic~s or share P's. 
,Il'odel with Benefit Spills 
Thus far it is cviderit that there is no reason for matching and equaliza- 
tion grants fro111 one level ot' government to another. We have not thus 
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Car considered, however, the  most important aspect of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, the aspect usually used t o  rationalize rnatchirlg grants- 
~iarrlely benefit arid cost spill-outs and spill-ins. 4 case of a benefit spill-out: 
for instance, is one in which part of the benefits that are provided by one. 
sub unit accrue t o  individuals across a political boundary in allother sub 
unit. In a system where vertical and horizontal splitting of authority exists. 
spills occur across political boundaries into areas over which the providir~g 
government has no jurisdictior~. I r i  order lo show the effec.~ of' benefit 
spill-outs o n  resource allocatiorr. let us assume that each sub decides how 
much education it will provide and that  part of the benefits of that educa- 
tion will become spill-outs to another sub: and, in a similar manncr, the 
other sub will contribute spill-ins to thc. forn~c:r sub. 
Let us assume that  without the  phenomena of spill-outs or spill-ins. 
school district X would be faced with a t ra~~sformation curve .SIB (Figure I ) 
between education on  the vertical axis and a composite of all other goods 
o n  the horizontal axis. Likewise Y is faced with transformation curve ,4'R1 
(Figure 2). Figures 1 and 2 indicate that Y is a less wealthy district than 
X but that  they both have the same technical possibilities. Equilibrium for 
X is at (1 and for Y it is at a'. The optimum allocation of resources to  
education, if the distribution is assumed desirable, is the provision of' oh 
educatior~ in X and ob' in k: 
Vow let us consider the fact that b m ~ f i t s  fro111 education spill out  t o  
other areas for the following reasons. 
1. RIigratiori of students t o  other areas transports the productiori- 
creating capacity, the taxation capacity. the lower unemployment ratrs, 
and the lower social welfare costs. 
2. Advances in technology and improvements in skills from education 
increase productivity arid decrease costs. The decreawd cbosti enhanct. tht. 
income of people in other areas through the national market. 
3. The option value of education provides the oppor tun~t?  to  ob ta i~ i  
still further education, the opportunity lo have broader employment 
choices, and the oppor tun~ty  to hc,dge against the vicissitudes of techno- 
logical change. The whole society benefits from this inventory of options. 
4. Education helps t o  provide an ~niorrned, literate electorate i r ~  na- 
tional, state, and local elections. 
111 introducing external benefit spill-outs into our school districts, X anci 
Y, we will assume that  the  benefit spill-outs are the same proportion of the 
total benefits a t  all levels of educational output.  We will also assurne tht: 
blyrdal "backwash" effect in that the poor school district will lose a 
greater percentage of its total educational benefits. Thest: two assumptions 
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Figure 1 
District X 
Education 
Figure 2 
District Y 
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will shift the two transtormation curkc.5 to  4C anti 1 '( ' 11) \ '111(1 1 . .111(1 
make the equilibrium t o  oc and oc' of' cducatlor~. 
E d u c a t i o ~ ~  has become* nlorc. c.xpc.nsivc. rt,lativc. to  tilt, c.o~r~pobitt. I)(.- 
causc a proportion of each dollar spent 0 1 1  cthlcation u-ill l~:ro111(. ;I s1)ilI- 
out  t o  other districts. It is this technical naturt. of the be11t:Cit that c,lrangc,s 
thtk relativt, cost ol' the two goods. Due. t o  this (.hang(. it1 the c ~ ~ s t  of c*tlucn- 
tion, Weisbrod says that in rrraking its d r c i s i o ~ ~  c:ach (1istric:t \ \ i l l  e1isrc.gartl 
both spill-ins t o  itself ant1 the‘ valuta of' the 1)c~nefits going to ottl(.rs: 
W'hile spill-outs of benefits tend to ditrlirlish c~xprrlditrlrc.~ 
from their optimal level, spill-iris rna! not bring opposite. 
rcsults. . . . To thr  cxtertt that they arc, the spill-ill> 
c,onstitute fixed benefits; as such they will llave rlo ini.111- 
cmcc on  decisions a t  the margirt. . . . 3 .  
Therefore thert* will be a total underallocat~orl of resourc r .  to  t*(lrlcat~o~l 
The composite good will be iubstitutcd f o r  r .ducat lo~~ 
N a n  U'illian~s4 objects to  thr  fact that only tht* substitution c.l'f't:ct ih 
considert:d i r i  b'eisbrod's analysis artd insists that thf,  additional ir1c:onlr 
created by benefit spill-ins rrlust also 1 ) ~  c~orrsidt~rt.d. .-\c.c.ordirlg to  his lir~t. 
of reasoning, 111 our n ~ o d r l  the bc'nc't~t -pill-ln would c.,~usc. tl~c. budget 
restralnta. 1C and A'(" .  to  makc. a parallel s h ~ l t  t o  El )  and E'l)' The yh~ft 
t o  ED for X will be equal to spill-out 'L Irorr~ Y antJ thv s h ~ f t  o  b"nr for Z 
w11l be equal t o  thv -pill-out ~Vlfrorn 1. 'Cott. though, that a t  tI1(. rtvw 1 ~ 1 t u -  
librlurn. the total of od and od' t.ducdt~art 15 grtSattbr th'rn the or~girtal total 
ot ob  and ob' 
After benefit spill-outs and spill-ins have been corlsidered therc: is a total 
overallocation of resources t o  edrlcatiori iC tht. origir~al distributior~ of 
resourccs is considered the  correct distribution. There is less tduc:at io~~ 
(underallocation) irk the poor district but rnorr educatior~ (ovt:rallocatior~) 
in the rich district because of the resources it has rrccivetl frorn th(: poor 
district and because of its tastes. This is si~riilar to  thc shil't o f  c.ducatvc1 
people from the central city (Xj to tht, suburbs ( Y )  \vht:rc~ thc: s u b ~ ~ r h  i .  
given a greater tax base and thert:f;)re. 1)ettt:r scl~ools. I+:vc.r~ il '  tht, two 
Cistricts had equal spill-outs. t:qual spill-ills. and tht. 3anlc tastrh. ~ h c .  
original eqdlibrinrn woultl not br rc:achc.d because 01' the diff'rrrrlt (.l'i'c(.t 
caused by spill-outs and spill-iris, t h ~  spill-out being a suhstitutiorl ef'l't:ct 
and the spill-in being an incorllr rf'fvct. 
3 ~ u r t o n  A .  Weisbrod, External Benefits of Public Education: .An Econon~ic 
Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Industrial Relations Center, 1964). 
p. 6. 
' ~ lan  Williams, "The Optimal Provision o f  Public Goods in a System of 1,ocal 
Government." Journal o f  Political Econonxy l>XXIV (February. 1966). 
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Because of thc rc:distribution of iricomc., Williams termed this situation 
an ovt:rallocatiori oi resources t o  education. Braitlard and Dolbear, how- 
tAvrr. say that ". . . one should not stipulate a distribution of income, derive 
op t iml~m atnounts for thti various conirnotlities, arid then compare these 
aniounts with thr: aniounts that would prvvail under a different distribu- 
tion o l  incotne."' IJuless the origirtal distrilmtion is considered more 
tl(:sirable, the distribution after spills cannot be considered a misallocation. 
'The gt:r~cral proposition that Saniuelson and blusgrave have stressed rlumer- 
ous times is that tht: o p t i n ~ u m  allocation ran be determined only after 
decidir~g upon an optimuln distribution. ltegrdless of what distribution 
t)c,nc:hrnark is used :is thr. corrtbct c l is t r i l~~t ion,  however, two conclusions 
I-VIII~I~II .  First, the substitution efft:ct will causc fewer resources t o  be 
11t:vc)trd to  c,d~ication than if b e n d i t  spills did riot exist. Second, unequal 
spills arnong districts trc:at some. districts morr favorably than other 
clistrictj. 
Evidently Hreak think> that  thc original (before spills are introduced) 
tlistribution and equilibriurri is always the c.orrect lbenrhrnark because he 
justifi(~s rnatching grants on  the basi.; of rccdpturing the escaped benefits. 
IIc says: 
Iritergoverr~mcr~tal p a n t s  dt:signt:tl t o  minirriize the dis- 
torting effect of benefit spillouts on  the level of state 
and local spr:nding should . . . bc rllatchirig grarits with 
both the grantor arid the grantee sharing in the cost of 
the supported programs . . . . Such a situation calls for 
variable rnatchirlg grants . . . .6 
'1hert:fore each lower level uf government will be givc:n a matching subsidy 
c:ciual t o  its spill-outs, and sirlce subsidies must be acquired from some 
source. they will all be taxed equal t o  their spill-ins. This means that 
pa)vt:rty-stricken districts, which are distorting optimality by having more 
spill-ins than spill-outs, will be taxt:d more heavily and receive less subsidy 
than rich districts. Of course, this analysis is only an  excuse used by 
aclvocates of matching grants. I t  is iricorrect in principle, impractical for 
policj,  arld unacctsptable in terms of equity. 
'Ue can set, from 1:igurr 3 that the  analysis is incorrect in principle. 
E'igurt, 3 is the barne as Figure 2 after accounting for  benefit spills and 
arriving a t  thts c,quilibrium allocation of resources t o  education of E'D'. 
S~i l l i am C. Brainard and F. Trenery L)olbear, "The Possibility of Oversupply of 
Local 'Public' Goods: A Critical Note," Journal of Political Economy LXXV (Febru- 
a r y ,  19hi'),  p. 87. 
' ~ e o r ~ e  F. Break, lntergouernnaental Fiscal Relations in the United States (Wash- 
ington, I).(:.: The Rrookings Institution, 1967), p. 77. 
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Figure :-I 
District Y 
Education 
Composite 
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Now if we give a subsidy to district Y equal to  spill-outs n and tax equal 
to spill-ins rn, we see that the new equilibrium is not the original bench- 
mark 06' but a different amount, oe'. So district Y will end up, after 
subsidies and taxes, producing oe' of education and using part of the sub- 
sidy for increased production of the conlposite good. 
Proposing the use of matching grants in order to  minimize the distorting 
effect is also inlpractical for numerous reasons. These reasons will be 
discussed in the following section. 
THE PROGRAMM.4TIC APPROACH AND SPECIFIC ISSUES 
An approach more consisterrt with current thought than the use of 
traditional grant devices in providing a desired areawide goal is for the 
morr central government to provide the service that is wanted. The signifi- 
cant benefit spills created by some government endeavors make it imper- 
ative that a higher level of government assume responsibilities for that 
endeavor. Therefore the policy which stresses "local responsibility" in the 
financing of education is an irrational one if ecorlomic efficiency is con- 
- 
sidered important. This does not mean, Iiowever, that the local district 
should riot be allowed to  finance the level it wishes to  finance, given the 
local district's assessment of costs and benefits. The level of government 
that should provide a function depends on how wide an area is encom- 
passed by the benefits frorn the function. At all three levels of government 
education provides direct benefits that do not spill over to  other govern- 
mental units. 
The programmatic approach, as its nanle implies. is an approach in 
which a specific program or plan is formulated and priced to  obtain a 
governmental good or service. The progranl is formulated in order to take 
account of peculiarities that arise in different areas. The programmatic 
approach requires that the governmental unit responsible for a social or 
merit good be responsible for designing a budgetary plan for mobilizing 
the necessary resources to  provide that social or merit good. 
The traditional approach has been more concerned with matters such as 
i.otal expenditures, financial matching devices, equilization grants, fiscal 
rapacity, and fiscal effort than with formulating and pricing programs. The 
argument here is that these matters are not important to  providing a given 
level of a given kind of ProLTam; therefore they art: not legitimate deter- 
~rlinarits of t,xpenditures. Elaich level of government has its own responsi- 
t~ility and therefore should not allow its program to frustrate the fulfill- 
ment of that responsibility through fiscal dthvices such as those listed. The 
most nonprogrammatic expenditure is thv unconditional grant which 
requires no hpecific action on the part of the recipient. There is a wide 
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varlet) of approaches tallirig betwrrri tht, purely programmatic dnd t h t ~  
unconditior~al. 
'The object ln a d o p t ~ n g  the programrnat~c approacli a. destgn tor 
r-xpenditurt. po11c.y IS neither that of measuring present or future denidr~d 
nor the ~rriposs~ble task of rnaking ~ I I  'I prlori deter~rut~atlon of H tidt tht, 
demand "ought" t o  be. ;Vunierous correlations and regrcasitoni havv brc.11 
completed to discover  he dcterrninarits of  demand Such r~ltlcxc.s ,irt 
hclpful 111 making expc.nd~turr pred~ctionb, but thty artL riot dn lndt>\ c)I 
how nluch ought to bt, 5peiit because dt t~tr ldei  .lnd prefert.n(t*- .Irirorlg 
polltical un1t5 111 spite of sirnilar "dt~terminants." The purpoqt. Ilert. ri to 
adopt a11 ~ris t~tut ional  rrdngerncnt whtch will allow for the full t.xprc3* 
sort of dernand, whatever the demand rrray br, and to allow for cl-iaiigt~s 
in dernarid 
What  Level for What  Program? 
In the approach suggested here tbach 1rvt.l of goverrinlent would bc 
allowed t o  decide what programrnat~c goals tt wishes t o  pursue. \ o  pro- 
gram would be excluded from any Ievr~l. The Idea has only partla1 accept- 
ance III the literature. For ~ristancc~. ltoger Frt.c~nan says 
If the Eederal government fcds  it ought t o  determine 
what should be done in a particular public service, let it 
take over the  whole service rather than have the local or 
state officials beco~rie mert, agents o f  the central govern- 
ment.7 
Oh the one hand, Freeman is theoretically correct in hls perceptlor1 that 
there arc. services the Federal government ought to provide. 111 addition. 
he indicates that  state and local goverrrments have prerogatives of their 
own and should not just be agents o f  tht. Federal government. Yt,t hr 
denies the  latter wheri he says, ". . . let it [Federal] takc over the wholr 
service. . ." He is overlooking the possibility that  the  state or local artLa 
may want t o  capture additional local benefits by adding still more expend- 
itures to  the same service, and overlooking also the possibility of coopera- 
tion among Federal, state, and local levels in order for each t o  carry out 
its own program with the least admirtistrative cost. 
Other authors also advocate that  programs for distribution, growth, ant1 
stabilization should be limited only to  the central government. Brazer 
expresses this idea when he  says: 
. . . we recognize that  government a t  the city level can- 
not really hope t o  operate effectively or  importantly in 
7Koger A. Freeman, "Federal Grants and the Decline of the Federal System," 
Roceedings of the Fifty-eighth Annual Conference on Taxation of the National Tax 
Association (November, 1965), p. 149. 
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what I'rofcssor 'Ilusgravc~ has ralletl tho "stabilization" 
and "distributior~" bra~~c:hc:s ol' thr public c.c.onolriy. . . . 
I~Iirsch says, "Thc: F'cderal gover r~n~er~ t  . . . by a Itroad consr:llsrls has 1)rc.n 
assigned the  income rcdistril~uting func.tic)~r . . . ."9 'I'wo pages later, how- 
ever, hc cot~tradicts himsvlf by saying that public- wi:IEarcb services ran bc. 
cffc:ctivc.ly- provided by tht. local urban govctrnniiXl~t, and on his tablt. of 
servicc. spillovers hr claims that n o  bcncslit <pillavcrs car1 be expectchd frorn 
public wellarc, scrvices. T11c:refort~ local govcbr~ltnc.~~ts do  have an intcrest 
in these rt:distril,utior~ programs. IS the c.cbr~tral Icvc:l sets a tninirrrurn stand- 
ard of  ir~cornc. for csveryolrc, there is no rcason for preventing local areas 
from raising that standard l o  their own sati+l'ac:tion. 
l~ldiuidual Freedom 
There is also a rioneconomic a r g ~ ~ r r ~ e r ~ t  o f t e ~  givt-11 for lirniting the pro- 
visir)n of specified government p rogra t~~s  III a given Ir:vc:l of goverrrma~~t. 
Some try t o  c~xcludc: certain types of fiscal activity in a St:deralist systern 
:;in~ply on the basis that local autonorny is cotern~inous with individual 
Freedoms. :in example is Freeman, who has said: 
. . . the spertacular expansior~ o f  federal ?ants to  state 
and local units is leading t o  a c'entralizat~on of goverri- 
~nental  power a t  the expense of home rule, local-autorr- 
omy , and intlividual freedom." 
i t lother  r:xample is Weisbrod, who says: 
Individualism has long been a vital part of the American 
culturc. Onc of its manifestations has been thc strong 
tradition of local control over thc hystrnr of public edu- 
cati0n.l 
When o n r  remembers that India, Pakistan, the Sovitxt (Jnion, the  Congo, 
Switzerland, Ethiopia, and Rrazil are all federalist states, it becomes some- 
what cliificult to fit federal~sm into any rigid political, social, o r  eco- 
nomic system. In some cases local autonomy rnay protect individual free- 
doms, yc:t wt. are aware that in other cases it  protracts only local power 
structures and institutions that are anathema to individual freedoms. 
' ~ a r v e ~  Brazer, "The Role of Major Metropolitan Centers in State and Local 
Finances," Papers and Proceedings of the Seventieth Annual Meeting, American Eco- 
no'mic Review XLVII (May, 1958). p. 312. 
'werner Z. Hirsch, "Local Versus Areawide Urban Government Services," Nu- 
tic'nal Tux Journal XVIl (December, 1964), p. 336. 
'O~reeman, op. cit., p. 135. 
'~eisbrod, Public Education, op. cit., p. 10. 
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With a pro~~arnrnatic. approach thc:rtx is ;I ~iiuch bettcr charlet. of  riotic- 
ing obsolesccnct~s ot' tt~cltl1ic1uc.b. ot' anal) zing c:ff'cctivcnc:ss. o i '  obtaining 
I'r:edbacl\ information, and 01' triakitig I'utr~re fiscal pr~,dictions. I'reseritly 
ttidny programs are 1Irver J I I J ~ ) L ( ' ( ~  10 d ~ t t ~ r r r i ~ r i t ~  whetht'r t h ~ j  dchteve c'vc'~~ 
the ~ndefinitc. goal for wh~cli the,) &(.re. ir~tvnded. It~stcdd. only 'I Leu 
guideposts arc, 111dicatc.d dt ~11th beg~tlnlrtg-guidcpost~ that ldtcr beco~nc. 
vdguely defined rr.qutre~rierits wh1c.11 ~ n u i l  b r  Jtlrl b j  the, gr~rdntres I r i  order 
to qualify for the grdtit. I )rcw ' ~ y  5 
l'hohc. who picture, \kashingtotr db o r i t ,  rrlass ol t'ilcx\ and 
computers coritairirng nlorc. itiforlnatiori tharl they woul(l 
like. will bc c,ornfortc~d 1))  ( t i c .  c~wperit~ricc~~ of program- 
planners in attenlptlng to tbvaluatc. on-going progranis. 
Whatever lhr  files  lid cornputctrs do  contain, thert, i~ 
precious little. in them about how rnariy arid whom tht. 
programs arc reaching, and whet11c.r thry arc. doing what 
thcy are supposed t o  do. If thtb pnrpost. of' an adult hasic 
cbtlucatior~ progranl IS to  tract1 people how tc: r ~ u t i  ailti 
write, the Offict. of Educatior~ rnigh: reasonably I r c a  1.1- 
pecttrd t o  know how man, peoplt. theret)! actuall! 
learned how to read and write, hut it does not . . . 
The Public IIealth Srrvlce might bo expected to know 
whcthrr its various health icrvictls are in fact  riak king 
people hea l th~t~r ,  but it docs nut . . Those working on  
the income niairilrnancc~ stud\ found that thcb &'elfarc. 
4dministrat1ori could not tc4 ihem very much about the. 
public assistarice caseload- who was on urlfart.. wherc. 
did they come frorrr. whj  wf,rra they on it. what thr.1 
rteeded in order t o  get off ' * 
Due t o  t h r  dichoton~) o f  responsibility, leedback information is st,ldom 
brought together for arlalysis. Without this analysis, prediction for futurc~ 
needs cannot bc made. 
Matching Grants and Local Choice 
Thc programmatic approach does 1101 require higher level governments 
t o  rnakr value judgments for lower Irvel governments. When a central 
gcjvernrnent rcquircs a sub unit to pay a certain peicentage of a program, 
it is making judgments about a satisfaction received by the sub unit, and 
the decision is rnade without the participation of the sub. As stated above, 
Break favors this, but his own work can be used as support for the idea 
that matching grants should not be used. I-le says: 
12~lizabeth B. Drew, "HEW Grapples with PPBS," The Public Interest, No. 8 
(Summer. 1967), p. 11.  
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In principle, the grantor's share of program costs should 
equal the ratio of' external benefits to total benefits, but 
in practice problems of measurement compel the use of 
only a rough approximation of the idea. Nevertheless, 
some reasonable distinctions between programs, and be- 
tween states under a given program shodd be possible. 
The spillout of benefits from state and local educational 
programs, for example, is presumably greater for low- 
income than for high-income areas, since the former 
typically have the higher rates of out-migation. Such a 
situation calls for variable matching grants, the grantor 
government paying a higher share of FogTam costs in 
the lower-income states and localities.' 
Thus Break indicates that the grantor will impose value judgments on 
the granter in the case of education on the basis of presumptions about 
the typical grantee. Not only are benefits difficult to measure, but Break 
admits that they vary. To him such a situation calls for a variable matching 
grant. This sounds like an administrative impossibility. Since benefits are 
difficult to meaure and since they vary from local district to local 
district, the more defensible policy is for each level of government to 
provide its own expenditures without fiscal coercion by another level and 
without making value judgments for another level. In this way the partic- 
ipants of all levels can express their demands in relation to their self- 
assessed benefits. 
Additional support from Break which indicates that matching grants 
should not be used is that matching grants do not guarantee that the func- 
tion will be performed. IIe says: 
Consider . . . a state spending program that generates 
external benefits whose importance is indeterminate 
within a wide rangy, say between 10 percent and 40 per- 
cent of total social and private benefits. . . . [Grants] 
covering 10 percent of total cost, would expand that 
program and move its operation to the levels justified by 
its total benefit-cost ratio. To stop f'ederal aid a t  the 
point, however, would not guarantee optimal results. 
Even if external benefits were only 10 percent of total 
benefits, some states might be unable to  finance their 
own 90 percent shares, and if external benefits were 
more important than that even states with ample funds 
would lack incentives to give the program as much sup- 
port as it should have.14 
- 
13~reak,  op. cit., p. 77. (Italics added.) 
Nebraska Journal of Economics & Business 12:1 (Winter 1973), pp. 23-42.
prop:irlr \20111(1 1101 I ) ( .  ~)rovitit.d. 'I'lrc. ivitlttr i1rt.a r111 i1  4 1 0 1 1 l t l  I I O ~  l 1 . t  
al)+cwc.c. 01' ;I t r~atchi i~g (11-vic.cs I'r~cbtratc. itr p ~ ~ r p o h ~ . .  
rr11rllit11~11~ o f  tr~utc.Itit~g f)c~rc.r.r~iagt~, I I ~  c , o i t ~ c . i t l ~ .  ~ v i ~ l t  I,c.r~c~l'it,. ant1 clc,c.- 
awa! \\it11 thrs \)ossil)ilit! Illat 1111. soc.i;rl go1)c1 1% ill  trot t i c .  t)rc,\itit.el. 
,111ror1g p a r ~ t  prograrils. thc3 I ~ ~ l e ~ r ~ t a t c ~  Iligh\va! S > ~ ~ I . I I I  
i >  ( ! i s t i ~ ~ g ~ l i s l ~ ~ d  by the\ /rig11 f)roportiot~ of ( ~ ~ s t h  l ' i t i a~~( ,~*( i  
1)). ~ I I ( .  fc:dt:ral govc.rnn~t.nt (9O-05 ~)cxrc,c.t~t) urltl I)! tilts 
fact that thtbsct costs arc, 111ot l ' r o t ~ ~  cnrtl~arhctl taxc.? O I I  
motor fnc:ls. tir(:h a t ~ t l  tul,r.>. anti ot1rc.r procluc.tr 1)trr- 
c.hasc\d by highway uwrs. 'l'ht. lirogratn c~o~~sc ' c l r~~~t~ t l !  i s  
t'rt,c of t11c. usual appropriatior~ c o ~ ~ t r o l s .  a ~ ~ d  hitrc~s it 
c:lt.arly firlances a large share 01' i~~trastatc .  highwa) t)t*rrc,-  
fits, it is lihc.ly to ciivc,rt stat(, funds from h~~periol.  
LIS('S.~ 
1 5 ~ e l m a  blushlun, .'Harriers to a Systrrn of Fcdrral Grauts-irl-Aid," ~Vationnl 7;s 
Journal Y1II (Sr~tember. 1960), p. 21 1 
' 
~ r a z v r .  op.  cit . .  p. 3 14. 
7 ~ r e a h .  op.  cil.. p. Oh. 
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,I similar criticism has Ibc:cn ~rladr  o f  F'c.ilrral wvlfare grants. Stat~:s have 
t a h t ~ ~  funds frotn on(. wc:ll'arcl program ~h(:rtk t11c.y wrre ncc:ded and put 
tht:ln irrto otlrc:r wclfarc, programs it1 orclcr to gcst thc: grt,att:r n~atching 
f l~nds.  :4lthougli thc rational action for t l ~ c  1owc.r 1f:vel rnay be t o  dt:votc 
rc:sourcc:s where they will give* the geattbst benefits, no firiancially-prr:sscd 
It~gislaturt; wants to  be acc.usc*d of turning down thc large Frdt:ral bribe. 
\lushkin notes this misallocatior~ probleln and ofC~.r. a solutio~l: 
. . . it' tlre national govt:rnmer~t offers more dollars per 
statc. dollar for public assistance, itates may be te~nptet l  
to divert their fur~ds frorrl public. health to  public assist- 
ance. Fir~ancially inducc:d tra~isfvrs ol' this type can be 
avoided in state budgetary dccisiol~s by offering the same 
fcbderal share t o  a slate for each of the aided progralns.18 
Tlli? so lu t~on  scbcms to l'lil 011 at I~aast tl~rc-e counts. First, it does not 
dtternpt to  dccourlt lor thv b e r ~ c t ~ t  rc.cc.~tcd slncr this vdrics from & ~ a r i t ( ~  
to  pantcse. Svrond, rven though the dldcd share for each program ii the 
~ a l n c .  tire total amount golng t o  thc p r o p a m i  will diffvr and sub u n ~ t s  
w h ~ c h  have. already indiedied thdt the! bptv~d thew lunds t o  get t h ~ ,  largest 
Ft~derdl g a n t  will contlnur to tio so. Third, wch arta s t ~ l l  eft w ~ t h  the 
problcm ol conr~parir~g the lucratlvc. Fvd~.ral grant to local progrdlrls for 
wh~c-h thcre are n o  g a n t ?  ?'he k~cttcr s o l ~ ~ t i o ~ l  would be to rt,plarcs thc 
- 
rnat~:hit~g approacl~ with a progran~matic onch. 
Even if' a fu~lctional ~natching p a n t  IS usvd ~t should not bc open- 
c.nc1t.d. Brrah di~grc.11.;. say ing that t l ~ e  
. . . fourth and final distinguishill r characteristic of opti- 
mizing grants is tha~t they shorll a" be open- rather than 
closed-end-that is, the grantor should agree to  share 
whatever program costs the grantee wishes t o  incur and 
not t o  limit its support t o  somc fixed amount each 
!ear.19 
I f  the grantor drcides on a given level of expend~tures  which match(,\ 
benefits with costs, thcre is no reason t o  expcLct additional extcrnal benefits 
to be forthcoming from exp1:nditures beyond that  point. With a closr.tl-end 
grant, local govc,rnrnents will bc. more liliely to u s  the grant effectively. 
Stimulation and Dernonstmtion 
A rcaaon often given for 'I rnatching grant is that it will stirnulate the 
I O W ~ T  level t o  take avtion I I I I  a f u ~ ~ c t i o r ~ .  a i t h  stimulation, as discussed 
aljove, the higher lev1.1 is rnaking value judgments about what the local 
- 
' 8 ~ ~ s h k ~ n ,  op. at., p. 208. 
19f3reak, op. at., 11. 78. 
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level should IN: doing and what knowledge the local level should have. 
Spills arc. not involvt:d tlxcc:pt insofar as d i s t r ibu t io~~ of information and 
tt:cIinicluch is thv c:etltral goverr~n~et~t 'h  responsibility. Without spills thr: 
htirnulatiotr rri~lst conlci through dc~rnonstratiorr. To dcrnonstrate t o  the 
local levt:! kucans that 111(, project is a local matter and thc: choicc. ot 'adop- 
tion should bti lel't to  thr. local unit. With thr) p rogamn~at ic  approach, 
rc,jcction u l  tht: demor~stratiot~ ih riot 1c:l.t to the volition 01' a local govern- 
ment by allowing the local to rt~fnsc: to  ~riatch the central matching grant. 
Ll'ith the progammatic. approach thc dc.rr~onstratiorr is sure to br  made, 
and tht- local governtnent nlay accept or rt:jflct tht: idea. 
Labovitz's evidence, as presented by Xlushkin, seems t o  indicate that 
the programmatic approach could be arl effeclivr stirnulant. She sum- 
marizt:~ L,abovitz7s work or1 the effectivc~ncas of categorical aid as a stimulus 
to  state a c t i o ~ ~  under certain prohvams: 
State and local expenditurrs for vocational education 
have increased over the period of operation of the voca- 
tional education program faster than federal aid. Sirni- 
larly, stat(, funds for vocational rehabilitation and for 
public health have increased more than federal monies. 
These relativc changes arc rrflectcd in reduced federal 
sharc of cost . . . . 
'Thus t o  the extent that  the grant mechanism is used 
to pinpoint a national objective and to encourage state 
and local action in a specific direction, block grants arcA 
not a substitute for categorical aids.20 
Alushkir~ also supports specific grants for demoris trat io~~ purposes. She 
and Adanis say: 
In recent years . . . we have had a multiplication of small 
grant sums authorized as "seed monies" t o  focus attcn- 
tion on a needed public service through a demonstration 
of new techniques. 
innovation and experiment as primary devices for irn- 
proving the  efficiency of public services are gaining in- 
creased attentiom2 ' 
To Mushkin the block grant proposal " . . . is not consistent . . . with a 
national objectivt: of directing public services into specific channels."22 
20~hlushkin, op. cit., pp. 200, 202, 203. 
2 1 Selma Mushkin and Robert R. Adams, "Emerging Patterns of Federalism," 
National Tax Journal X I X  (September. 1966), p. 235. 
Z z % f ~ s h k i ~ ~ ,  op.  cit., p. 205 
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Compliance 
Two misconceptions about intergoverritnental expenditure approaches 
which support unconditional block grants are: (1) that the primary pur- 
pose of Federal aid is to provide states with financial support t o  carry out 
the states' objectives, and (2) that states provide a more efficient and ef- 
fective use of public funds if they have a wider latitude in directing 
expenditures. As discussed above, the purpose of central government ex- 
penditures is to provide neither of the two. 
Is the national interest iriet simply by providing states 
with funds for a broad program area? An affirmative 
answer assurnes that the national governmerit has PO 
interest in direction of program content and no more 
interest in one part o l  the broader program than in 
another. 
hlost Federal aid programs, however, originate in 
rather specific public needs and . . . categorical aids have 
become an important instrument by which national ac- 
tion ih identified with those  interest^.?^ 
Thr. programmatic approach spells out how these public needs will be met. 
has been explained, the central level should not dictate strictly state 
and local programs, but neither should state or local administrative inef- 
fictiveness and rioncompliance frustrate broad-based wants. Due to "home- 
rule" for education funds, the national and state interest has long been 
frustrated by dvnying minority groups access to education. 
Formula Terms 
In reviewing grant-in-aid formulas, expenditure determinants such as 
fiscal capacity, population, effort, and regression coefficients are found. 
These are of a rather dubious nature if the purpose is to provide a govern- 
mental function. 
The fiscal capacity term is sometimes rationalized by a "fence post" 
theory of fiscal federalism. Like its political counterpart which denies one- 
man-one-vote political representation, this theory of fiscal federalism 
argues that the way to attack individual povcxty is through a spatial grant 
baised on fiscal capacity. This rationalization is used even when the grant 
to the spatial area is for some function's need that is unrelated to income, 
whether individual or spatial. Income distribution, however, should be 
pursued on an individual basis. The problem of fiscal federalism " . . . 
springs from the technical nature of the services arid the federal system 
- 
23k~ushkin, op. cit., p. 199. 
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itsc4l' rotlrc~r t l ~ i r t r  t'rorir tlil'l't:rir~g r.c:orrolt~ic potrrrtials a ~ r d  the. c:hoic:c. ol' 
rc~distril,utivt~ fisc:al systvrtrs l)! subordinat(* units."24 
1Lt.ah apvt-s that ~.clualizatiorr tcLrrrrs shorllei rrot k ) c \  itlcluded i r i  flrrrc- 
tional p a n t s  i l l  o r d t ~  to  clia~rgc~ the. I'ircal c.apacit! 01' ir~cji\,itlual.~ or govtbrrl- 
~ n c ~ l r l , ~ :  
'I'hough tlit*! Iracc. 1)vt.tr i~lc.rcsasingl! t.uploitc.d i t r  tlris 
c.o~rtrtr!- i t 1  rc5c.c.nt years. the. c.clualization powi,rh 01 '  I ' ~ r t r ( . -  
tiolral I'c~tloral gralrt:: arts stric,tl> lirllitcsci. Rasirall! . the. 
rctasoll is that the. p r l t s  lllc*rnst~lvc.s Iravc u rcbstric.tt.d 
role, to play ill tht* f'c.tl(:ral fiscal 3) stestir ~ra~nt.l> . to rairt. 
i~ttt*rpc.rsor~al c:cluity and irrcreasc. c*corro~rlic c.i'l'icit~ric.~ I,? 
[,a! irrg I'or the. c.stc:rrial bc.~lcfits gr*rrc.r:ttrd b! t l ic ,  Jp(~tr(i- 
i r ~ g  propanis of stat(* alrd local govorrrrr~c~rits. I'rot)c~rl? 
risc.11. tlrc.roi'orc>, I'r~rrclional grattl* c~~rrrrot !IIII[J t o  t.cjrlal- 
ix15 tlrc' a1)ilitic.s ol' t l ro .~ ,  gov(*rrrrrrt-rrts to  s r ~ p l ~ o r t  ae . t i~i-  
tit+ ol' p11rt.1y lotrill i11tc.rcst. To c~rriploc tl-rt.l~r for that 
t ~ l r t ~ ) s t *  woultl I)(, to i~rtc:rfcrc. ul~jrlrtiliabl) \vith s t a t ,  
ilrrd Io(.;rI prvrogati\rt*x to  lnatlagcx t1rt:ir own fiscal affairs. 
\\II(,II ( * q ~ r a I i z i i ~ i o ~ ~  is tilt, goal, i t  is r~ri(~ot~(iii io~raI g~atits- 
ill-itid khcit shoul(l l ~ e  th(. c,cxtltcbr t,1'irttc~i1tiorr.~" 
\rrotlic~r ralior~alizalior I'or ir~cortrc. tc~rrrt> i r i  o\pe~rr(litrlrc~ L~rrnulah i .  
that i tre~ot~lt~. ~ ~ s u a I l >  p S r  t.irpitii. is ii tllciraurt,  rot t , t r i >  of' l'is(,;~l ~.api~cit! 
hut of' I I I Y Y ~  ah ~ 1 ~ 1 1 .  3~11 irs ~ (~11a l l t~ r  3Latt.3. '.(:l(sarl> 1 r t . 1 ~ 1  . . . ,.:III kirr! 
with plLr t.apitir irtcorrrc.." 2 6  Sirnilarl? . tli<b hatrrtn uc.ctrsatiotr (.all be. triatlt. 
i11)oti t tvrilr- srrc.lr a:: popr~lation i r l ~ t l  rc.pc.hsiorl c.ot.fl'ic.icwts 01 '  past c-spc.rrtl- 
itr~rtss. \ polit.! t o  givv all tlrt. pol)~r la t ie)~~ tht, ahilit! t o  rc.itd (lot,> trot 
trrakc ~ ~ o j f i ~ l i r t i o t ~  a rrrc.asllrc, 01' t~lpt.trditrtrt~ rrt.c.d. f(r.~c.saiorr (~ot~fl ' i~ie:rr t~ 
01' past c ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ c i i t t r r t ~ s  ;rrcX rrs J'111 for prc.dic*tir~g what h i r ~ ~ l  01' hoc.ial goods 
pc.oplt* trta! rvarrt. gi\c.r~ c:c,rtaitl t.c~or~orrric and social irtstitr~tiolrh. t)ut tht:) 
arc, trot rr*c*ful I'or rrrc~ctsrrrilrg prcsc,rrt tc~c.lrr~ical rtt~.dh. htrowirrg that tht, 
'l'r~llirliot~r;~ s ~ t roo l  distri(.t i r r  (:ofi't't' ( :o~rtrt! , '1'1'1111ehst~t. Ira3 a I~iglr corrvla- 
tiotr l)t.t\vc.c.lr p s r  p r r~~i l  r,r~rrt,rtt c ~ c i ~ ~ c a t i o i ~  c~xpt~rrditurc~+ atrd 1)c.r etapita trnc 
(.as11 \ i ~ l r l ( .  01' ii~st'sst'd asst.1~ is 1 1 0  (.otrtril)utiotr toward plarrtling t.d~rcatiot~ 
l'or lhc, rrorr-l~;nglisl~ speaking ehili~rt~rr i r r  Zapata (:ourrt?. '1't.xaa. lisirrg 
rc:gc*>sio~r t~oot'fic.ic~t~ti- tnn> rrlvrc.l! hclp to  ptv-pc.tr~at~\ rrisalloc~atiorrs. 'I'ht. 
I~rc,k~lrart~nratic approavh I,!~)arsc.> thvst. duhioui; tchrlrrs i r t i t l  c.ortc.t.rlla itsell' 
wit11 t l r t .  tc*t~hr~it~al n~t.i~~rtrc.s 0 1 '  ~~t ' t ' d .  
24110ward G .  Schallrr. "Federal Grants 111 Aid: r\ fitvirw." Proceedings of 
the I*'ifty-eighth ,tnnuul Cor~.ferrrrcf~ or1 Ilixotior~ of the Vutiorlcll Tux ,Issociation 
(Novcml)c.r. 1965). p. 106. 
2 5 l h a h .  01). (.it.. I). 127. 
"~challrr, of,. cil . .  1,. 101 
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Effort is included in some allocation formulas and is measured as the 
ratio of expenditures t o  fiscal capacity. \'hen rewarding cffort either on  
an individual program basis o r  or1 the  basis of all governmental functions, 
the higher levd is interfering with local value judgments. The higher level 
is bribing the lower to expend morc on  on(: program than on another; and 
o n  the basis of all governmental functions. the bribing is done to get the  
arc:a to  experid relatively more on social than on private goods. If c:ffort is 
rt:warded, then a wealthy area, where tastes for social goods are stronger 
than in poorer areas, will receive morcs than tht: poorer areas. This is an 
unacceptable concept of equity. 
As H i r s ~ h ~ ~  and ~ r e a k ~ ~  have explainc,d, the overlapping and multi- 
plicity of goverrlnlental units is necessary to  adjust adequately for spills. 
'Var) ing service spills indicate that  some serviccs, such as libraries, should 
Ile handled by local urban governments; othvr ser\ic%t.s, such as 5treet main- 
- 
tenance, by metropolitan areas; still others, such as planning, water, and 
[)owr:r, by more arcawide governmental units. Since the areawidc govern- 
ruerital units will overlap other units such as states, counties, and cities, 
cooperation among t'hese units is necessary. An optimal solution is really 
impossible unless the multitude of overlapping governmental units do  
work together. Without cooperation one unit will not know what t o  ex- 
pect in the way of spill-ins from the other units, and therefore cannot 
riitionally adjust its own resources t o  provide the desired level of services. 
Intergovernmental cooperation will become even more important in the 
fr~ture. .As the population grows and mobility arid the demand for public 
sc:rvices increase, the spillover problem will become rnore pronounced and 
complex. In order to cooperate effectively, the respective units must be 
al~lt: t o  communicate well-defined programs with estimates about costs and 
ahout the direction and extent of benefits. The Advisory Commission on  
Iritergovernmental lielations has expressed the samc idea in the  following 
manner: 
Cost-benefit analysis designed to provide a basis for co- 
operative negotiation+ among jrrrisdictioris has come into 
rather extensive use recently in conjunction with many 
Federal programs, especially in regard t o  watcr resources, 
recreation, and highways. This technique may offer help- 
ful guidelines for use by separate jurisdictions in metro- 
politan areas. 
2 7 ~ i r s ~ h ,  op. cit., p. 338. 
28~reak ,  op. cit., p. 69. 
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For rnany metropolitan areas. a sirlgle art:awitit. gov- 
t:rrlrnent whosc boundaries are c*oterminous with tl~c. 
scope of a particular servic:e is ~lr i ther  likely nor nt3ces- 
sarily appropriate. I r r  many situatiol~s it appear* rnorch 
likely that ad hoc or  functiorl-by-functiorl arrangenlelits 
among existing local units will assure that thest, furrctior~s 
will be performed more r:fficirntly or1 an art:awidc basis. 
Such arrangements will requirt. allocating the  costs 01' 
st:rvicc:s among the i r~de~ender l t  units on a fair a r ~ d  vclui- 
tablr basis.*' 
J u s t  as thc tcchr~ical knowledge. c.ontaitred in the prograrnrnatic plan 
nlakes ir~tergovernrnental c:ooperatior~ t.asic.r. it also tr~akt>s ir~terproganr 
coordinatior~ t:asier. Program coordir~atior~ is necessary if various prograrlw 
art: not t o  frustrate the objcctives o f  on(. anotht:r. 111 additiorl? rnuch ad- 
rninistrativc. cost can bt: saved by progarn coordination. The prograln- 
rnatic approach increases the possibility of coordinatiorr because each gov- 
ernrnt:rltal unit knows precisely how rnuch of what specific progarrl is to 
I r c l  accomplished. With matching funds the local I t . \ t ~ l  rnrlst dtscide to 
match thr. f'unds before coordination can hcgirl, and tsach sLa11. may rnatc11 
a diffcrt:nt set o t  programs. With uricoriditional parlts,  thchrr, is rlo prior 
knowledge of rithcr which f'unds will bt: usctd or how they will bt. utilized. 
After corlsiclerirlg theses specific issues i l l  corijur~ctiot~ with thr:or) ? it 
appears that a programmatic approach which excludes ~na tch i r~g  arlcl equal- 
ization grants posszssc:~ thc greatest promist, for el'i'icierlcy in ilrtergovcrtr- 
r ~ ~ e n t a l  experltliture policy. 
2 9 ~ . ~ .  Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, ,Wetropolitan Social 
and Economic Disparities: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations in Central 
Cities and Suburbs, A25 (Washington, D . C . :  I1.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 
p. 57. 
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